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Title 
 
Empirical test of the trust – performance link in international alliances context 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper focuses on the influence of trust on international alliances performance. Trust has 
been theoretically recognised to produce positive effects on alliances success. However, the 
link has rarely been empirically proven. We elaborate on the major difficulties that may 
explain this and propose a model for the understanding of that influence, where trust 
antecedents are also considered. The link is validated through primary data collected from 232 
international alliances of Portuguese firms and analysed through structural equation 
modelling.  
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Introduction 
International alliances are popular among managers and academics. However, despite their 
popularity, alliances have historically had a high failure rate (e.g. Bleeke and Ernst 1991; 
Gomes-Casseres 2000a). In this context, studying the reasons that explain the success or 
failure of international alliances is an important task (Kanter 1989; Bleeke and Ernst 1991). In 
order to understand success and failure, measures of the success of alliances had to be 
developed. The search for the “magical formula” of success gained followers (Gulati 1998). 
In this search several factors have been used for a better understanding of alliances success. 
Within the inter-firm relationships literature, topics such as trust, information exchange, 
conflict management, and flexibility have received a considerable amount of attention. 
 
This paper studies the influence of trust on the success of international alliances. Trust is seen 
as a behavioural trait of relationships able to explain the success of international alliances. 
The paper will start by defining the main concepts in this research: international alliances, 
trust and performance. Then trust is contextualised in the international alliances literature, 
emphasising its character as a performance enhancer. Trust antecedents will be studied for 
their contribution to the relationship between trust and performance. The third section will be 
devoted to the problem of the international alliances success measurement, which is followed 
by data collection. The data resulting from 232 international alliances surveyed will then be 
analysed using structural equation modelling. Discussion and conclusions will follow in the 
fourth section along with limitations and some hints for further research. 
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1. Research issues on trust and international alliances performance and proposed 
model 
2.1 Key concepts 
2.1.1 How international alliances are understood 
International alliances refer to an international entry mode that includes several alternatives. 
Based on Contractor and Lorange (2002b) and on Geringer and Herbert (1989), international 
alliances are any medium to long-term cooperative relationship, whether or not based on 
equity or a contract, that entails frequent interactions between the allied corporations. 
Moreover, at least one of the allied corporations has to have its headquarters located outside 
the venture’s country of operations or should have a significant activity in more than one 
country. Thus, international alliances can be seen as a continuum of organisational forms of 
international modes, including all kind of agreements that extend business firm activities to 
foreign markets, while excluding arm’s length contracts and merger and acquisitions 
(Harbinson and Pekar 1998).  
 
In the literature of international alliances there are different labels given to the idea above 
described. Kauser and Shaw (2004) are an example of who use the terms “international 
strategic alliances” and “international partnerships” interchangeably. And there are authors 
that set their research to a particular type of alliances, such as joint ventures, (e.g. Geringer 
and Herbert 1989; Geringer 1991; Geringer and Herbert 1991; Johnson 1999; Lane, Salk et al. 
2001; Larimo 2003; Dhanaraj, Lyles et al. 2004), or licensing (Shane 1994; Kim and 
Vonortas 2004). In the marketing field international alliances are also studied though 
sometimes the labels are different. In Aulakh et al. (1996) and Bridgewater and Egan (2002) 
for example, the term international “marketing partnerships” is used and in some cases, the 
preferred expression is international “marketing-channels” (Etgar 1979; Mohr and Nevin 
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1990; Heide 1994; Andaleeb 1996; Goodman and Dion 2001; Claro, Hagelaar et al. 2003; 
Rosenbloom and Larsen 2003). In any case, the definition of international alliances provided 
above will be used and it is believed the labels “international alliances” or “international 
partnerships” are the most appropriate and can substitute the other terms used in the literature. 
 
2.1.2 How trust is defined 
There are almost as many definitions of trust as authors writing about it. Most definitions of 
the concept are influenced by the context of its use. In this case, the focus is on the 
international marketing context and therefore the marketing-channels literature will be used. 
Here, a substantial part of the literature views trust as a belief, confidence or expectation 
about an exchange partner’s trustworthiness that results from the partner’s expertise, 
reliability, or intentionality (Blau 1964; Rotter 1967; Schurr and Ozanne 1985; Dwyer, Schurr 
et al. 1987; Anderson and Weitz 1989; Moorman, Deshpande et al. 1993). This is the 
definition of trust that will be used. 
 
As a key element in relationship marketing (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Wilson 1995), trust is 
included in most of the relationship models (Wilson and Jantrania 1994). It is also one of the 
most widely examined and accepted concepts in relationship marketing (Ganesan 1994; Mohr 
and Spekman 1994).  
 
2.1.3 How international alliances success is understood 
There are several ways of measuring success in international alliances and here also it has 
been difficult to find a consensual approach among researchers. The lack of consensus is 
mainly due to the subjective character of the concept. “Indeed, success has a different 
meaning to different firms at different times.” (Bissessur and Alamdari 1998, p. 334). It is 
 6 
also due to difficulties in achieving a commonly accepted measure of success in alliances. 
These difficulties will be explained later in detail as well as the way they were dealt with. 
Before that, the understanding of alliance success will be presented, clarifying that success 
will be measured through managers’ assessment of performance.  
 
Performance has been used as an indicator of alliance success in many studies (e.g. Bucklin 
and Sengupta 1993; Dussauge and Garrette 1995; Kale, Dyer et al. 2002; Lambe, Spekman et 
al. 2002), namely through the use of managerial assessments. Several authors use managers’ 
assessment of performance in terms of their overall satisfaction with the alliance, or in terms 
of the extent to which an alliance has met the stated objectives (e.g. Anderson and Narus 
1990; Parkhe 1993a; Mohr and Spekman 1994; Saxton 1997). Based on the existing theory 
that uses performance measures to infer the success of an alliance, the terms “performance” 
and “success” will be used synonymously, that is – the evaluation of the satisfaction that 
parties to an alliance gain with this kind of agreement or even the satisfaction retrieved from 
the alliance itself, in the event that a third entity is created. This evaluation will be assessed 
through managers’ perceptions of satisfaction that are considered a reasonable way to assess 
alliance performance (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Anderson 1990; Geringer and Herbert 1991; 
Das and Teng 2000; Kale, Dyer et al. 2002). 
 
2.2 Research gap 
Various approaches are possible in the search for explanations for the success and failure of 
international alliances. One possible approach emphasizes relationships between the different 
partners involved in an alliance.  Specifically, it focuses on characteristics of alliances, 
namely behavioural and organisational characteristics (Kauser and Shaw 2004). In this 
context, trust was found to be critical (Ring and Ven 1992; Mayer, Davis et al. 1995; Das and 
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Teng 1998a; Zaheer, McEvily et al. 1998a). Therefore, trust has been widely used within the 
alliances literature and considered as fundamental for the relational governance of the 
partnership (Anderson and Weitz 1992; Mohr and Spekman 1994; Morgan and Hunt 1994; 
Claro, Hagelaar et al. 2003). 
  
However, despite the widespread consideration of trust as a determinant of successful 
relationships, “little research has been done on how trust (…) operates to affect the 
performance of interfirm exchange.” (Zaheer, McEvily et al. 1998a). In fact, several authors 
within the international business relationships field refer to this lack of research in the 
literature, and most notably to the gap of empirical research (e.g. Hosmer 1995; Aulakh, 
Kotabe et al. 1996; Inkpen and Currall 1998; Koza and Lewin 1998; Sako 1998; Möllering 
2003).  
 
2.3 Trust and international alliances in the literature 
2.3.1 The importance of trust 
International alliances, as do all inter-firm relationships, involve interaction. Several critical 
factors in business relationships that involve interaction have been studied. One of the most 
frequently studied is trust. Trust is a topic that has been gathering the attention of academics 
since long ago. However, the economics and business literature only recently started devoting 
attention to this topic, in most cases departing from definitions developed in sociology, 
psychology and social psychology (e.g. Deutsch 1958; Luhmann 1979; Barber 1983; 
Coleman 1988). However, definitions rapidly evolved and several conceptual papers were 
published about the concept (e.g. Hosmer 1995; Kramer and Tyler 1996; Gambetta 1998b; 
Nooteboom 2002). 
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Several advantages were assigned to trust. Trust was considered fundamental for cooperation 
to evolve (e.g. Morgan and Hunt 1994; Child 2001; Blomqvist and Seppänen 2003). It has 
also been identified as an important component in the success of partnerships, strategic 
alliances and networks of small firms (Powel 1996). Trust was recognised as able to reduce 
uncertainty and complexity inherent to business, especially in an international context (e.g. 
Anderson and Narus 1990; Parkhe 1993a; Zaheer, McEvily et al. 1998a; Child 2001). 
According to Parkhe (1998b), for instance, trust is key to the success of international 
alliances. Thus, companies willing to learn how to successfully manage an international 
alliance will have to focus on trust creation, development and maintenance.  
 
As stated by Parkhe (1998b) trust should be calibrated according to the different phases of an 
alliance. This idea goes in line with Boersma et al. (2003); Demirbag and Mirza  (2000); 
Hyder and Eriksson (2005); and Ring and van de Ven (1994) that studied the effect of trust at 
different stages of an alliance. Different studies gave rise to the common belief that, although 
its influence varies, trust is important in every phase of the life of an alliance. Indeed, it 
should always be possible to form a perception of trust between partners in an alliance and 
evaluate the satisfaction partners have with a particular partnership. If that satisfaction is 
measured through the performance of that partnership, then, it would be in fact important to 
understand the link “trust-performance”.   
 
2.3.2 Trust and international alliances performance 
Several perspectives have been used to learn about the topic of international alliances (Das 
and Teng 1998b), a topic that is receiving  more and more attention in the current competitive 
context (Yoshino and Rangan 1995). From the inter-firm relationships point of view, trust is 
studied as an important attribute of the behavioural characteristic of a relationship (Kauser 
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and Shaw 2004). It has been studied in this perspective by authors such as Anderson and 
Narus (1990); Child (2001); Mohr and Spekman (1994); Parkhe (1993a); and Powell (1990), 
specifically in the context of international partnerships. Under this approach trust was 
revealed to be important namely because it reduces uncertainty and complexity inherent to 
business in an international setting, an aspect that had been studied by several authors such as 
Child (2001) Hennart and Larimo (1998) Lee (1998b); Noordewier et al. (1990); and 
Ramaseshan and Loo (1998). 
 
An important benefit attributed to trust is its ability to enhance performance. The relationship 
between trust and performance is lacking in empirical evidence as has been claimed by 
authors such as Möllering (2003), Sako (1998), Koza and Lewin (1998) and Zaheer et al 
(1998a). In fact, though many studies refer to the conceptual relationship between both 
constructs (Barney and Hansen 1994; Inkpen and Currall 1998), no empirical evidence is 
given. Child (2003), for instance, associates superior performance to high levels of inter-
organisational trust; Parkhe (1993a), using opportunistic behaviour as a proxy of trust, claims 
a strong relationship between the perception of opportunistic behaviour and performance. 
However, none of these studies, nor many others in the field (e.g., Parkhe 1993c; Nooteboom 
1996; Uzzi 1997; Boersma, Buckley et al. 2003) succeed in measuring the success of the 
relationship.  
 
The reference to the positive impact of trust on international partnerships’ satisfaction, 
measured through performance, is made in several studies, as for instance, Aulakh and Kotabe 
(1997); Barney and Hansen (1994); Boersma et al. (2003); Buckley (1992); Cullen et al. 
(2000); Demirbag and Mirza (2000); Dhanaraj et al. (2004); Ganesan (1994); Inkpen and 
Currall (1998); Kauser and Shaw (2004); Lane et al. (2001);  Möllering (2003); Nielsen 
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(2002a); Nooteboom (1996); Parkhe (1993c); Ring and Van de Ven (1994); Sako (1998); 
Sako and Helper (1998); Smith and Barclay (1997); Teegen and Doh (2002);  Uzzi (1997); 
Zaheer et al (1998a), where the common belief is that trust brings about a superior 
performance. Nevertheless, only in Zaheer et al. (1998a) there is unequivocal evidence of the 
link. In Demirbag and Mirza  (2000) and Dhanaraj et al. (2004) the link is not tested; in 
Aulakh et al. (1996) trust is not significantly related to performance; in Lane et al. (2001) the 
relationship is proved, though it has not been initially hypothesised; in Smith and Barclay 
(1997) the link was tested with a second dimension for the trust construct; in Kauser and 
Shaw (2004) the relationship is between trust and alliance success; and in Mohr and Spekman 
(1994) with profitability (but not with satisfaction). 
 
Consequently, further evidence is necessary to quantify the relationship. It is accepted that, 
when involved in a partnership, a company tends: 
- to rely more on the ability of its partner and leave more space for working based on 
the confidence that the partner will do what he said he would do, while refraining from 
taking any unfair advantage (“goodwill trust”), 
- will act according to the competence yield (“competence trust”) and; 
- also according to the contract, if there is one (“contractual trust”) (Sako and Helper 
1998). 
This confidence may work as a catalyser for doing what is right and avoiding what may 
hurt the other partner’s interests. The reciprocity of attitudes is likely to feed this process 
and improve the chances to do more and better in face of this feeling. According to Kumar 
(1996),“partners that trust each other generate greater profits, serve customers better, and 
are more adaptable.” Moreover, it is believed that, working this way, partners will 
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increase their satisfaction with the relationship and that this satisfaction will be reflected 
in their perception of performance. 
 
Based on this, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: in an international partnership, there is a positive relationship between the amount of 
trust one partner places on the other and the performance that first partner perceives in its 
relationship. 
 
2.4 Trust antecedents  
Following the hints for further research in Zaheer et al. (1998a, p. 157), in the 
operationalisation of this link, trust antecedents should also be included. In fact, they say: 
“our understanding of interorganizational trust and its consequences would be greatly 
enhanced by a study of contextual antecedents of trust (…)” In fact, trust is considered an 
important relationship attribute and revealing its main ingredients may help managers to 
develop more effective international partnerships in the future (Kauser and Shaw 2004). This 
idea is in line with Aulakh et al. (1996) who claim the incorporation of different dimensions 
of the trust concept allow for a better understanding of the trust-performance link. Also Smith 
et al. (1995) state there is the need for further research on the study of trust and its 
determinants when studying partner relationships. 
 
As said by Seppänen et al. (Forthcoming, p. 13) “studies on trust need to be replicated, and 
extended to different types of contexts – i.e. different cultures, industries, and relationships – 
in order to improve their validity and generalizability.”. However, that has not been the case. 
According to Blomqvist et al. (2002), no replication studies have been conducted on trust 
research and “…there seems to be a tendency that each authors develop their own measures.” 
(p. 5) These same authors also found several concepts used as determinants of trust, such as 
relational norms, monitoring mechanisms (Aulakh, Kotabe et al. 1996), reputation of vendor, 
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satisfaction with previous outcomes, experience with the vendor (Ganesan 1994), shared 
values, communication, hostages or balanced asset specificity (Young-Ybarra and Wiersema 
1999). In their opinion, only shared values and communication are common concepts in these 
studies. 
 
However, if marketing channels theory is reviewed, Morgan and Hunt (1994) also use the 
same constructs plus opportunistic behaviour as trust antecedents. Many other authors refer to 
their research for further developments (Doyle 1995; Sheth and Parvatiyar 1995; Aulakh, 
Kotabe et al. 1996e.g. ; Johnson, Cullen et al. 1996; Reinartz 2000; Sirdeshmukh, Singh et al. 
2002). Thus, in order to obtain some of the replication claimed as necessary by Seppänen et 
al. (Forthcoming), the antecedents of trust proposed by Morgan and Hunt (1994) in their study 
of the trust construct: shared values, communication and opportunistic behaviour will be used 
as basis. Explanations for their use will be provided in the following sections.  
 
2.4.1 Shared values 
Enz (1988) considers shared values as a good proxy for the analysis of organisational culture, 
which can be inferred through the comparison between corporate ethical values of the partners 
involved in a relationship. Also Jeminson and Sitkin (1986) use this concept to describe 
similarities between organizations in terms of organizational culture, human resources 
policies and administrative processes. Das and Teng (2001c) referred to the importance of 
sharing similar values because it allows the creation of a “clan-like environment”, where the 
sense of belonging to the same team may foster dispute resolution and trust. This is an 
argument based on the belief that similar corporate cultures and values will promote 
organizational fit between partners. This idea was also defended by Inkpen and Currall (1998) 
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for whom similarities between partners’ organizational culture, policies and processes could 
lead to the development of trust.  
 
The reference to the positive link between shared values and trust can also be verified in 
Zaheer et al. (1998a) when they refer to the importance of “common fate”; and in Mohr and 
Spekman (1994) when they refer to the straight influence of trust on satisfaction. It is 
considered that the fact that partners in an interaction consider themselves as sharing the same 
obstacles that result from being involved in the alliance, may lead to a development of trust 
among them. This is the underlying idea of Sako (1998) who states that shared values among 
partners create value congruence that no rule or regulation can promote; and also the 
suggestion proposed by Sitkin and Roth (1993) when they state that shared values avoid the 
flourishing of distrust.  
 
With base on Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) it is believed that socialization leads to a common 
identity between partners and to collective interpretations of the reality they face. This social 
bond created between partners is likely to improve trust between them. Thus, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H2: there is a positive relationship between values shared among partners and the trust one 
partner places in the other. 
 
2.4.2 Communication 
Communication between partners has been used in several studies (Bialaszewski and 
Giallourakis 1985; Mohr and Nevin 1990; Moorman, Deshpande et al. 1993e.g. ), namely in 
an inter-firm relation context. It has been understood as the exchange of information between 
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partners. Anderson and Weitz (1989) used it as a determinant of trust, as well as Young-
Ybarra and Wiersema (1999) and Morgan and Hunt (1994). 
 
In Sako (1998), the provision of information, even when unilateral, was found to enhance 
trust, a claim that was corroborated by Zaheer et al. (1998a). Communication openness was 
also considered important for the conceptualization of the construct “trusting behaviours” by 
Smith and Barclay (1997). These same authors also advise further research to examine 
communication as a separate construct and its impact on trust. Communication, along with 
shared values, are the trust antecedents that raise little controversy as important determinants 
in the formation of trust.  
 
Based on this it is proposed that communication is a trust enhancer, no matter its form: 
personal or non-personal, electronically or by mail, solicited or unsolicited. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3: there is a positive relationship between communication between partners and the trust 
one partner places in the other. 
 
2.4.3 Opportunistic Behaviour 
The consensus characteristic of shared values and communication as determinants of trust 
exists in Morgan and Hunt (1994)’s study together with opportunistic behaviour. In Smith and 
Barclay (1997) forbearance from opportunism is also considered to be important in the 
conceptualization of trust. 
 
There are authors connecting trust and the perception of opportunistic behaviour, though the 
direction of the link is not obvious. Inkpen and Currall (1998), for instance, consider 
forbearance as a trust consequence; Aulakh et al. (1996) consider the role of trust as a 
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behavioural deterrent of opportunistic behavior; and Bradach and Eccles (1989); Chiles and 
McMackin (1996); and Hill (1990) think that the risk of the partner behaving 
opportunistically is lessened in the presence of trust. There are also authors that see both 
constructs as mere opposite concepts, as does Klein et al. (1978), for instance, who treats both 
notions as reverse; and other such as Parkhe (1993a) for whom opportunistic behaviour can be 
used as a proxy of trust. 
 
The two concepts are indeed related through the consideration of the risk dimension of trust. 
In fact, according to Inkpen and Currall (1998) risk has to be present for trust to operate, 
which is an idea that Nootebbom (2002) also subscribes to and that it is indeed common to 
several theorists on trust that elect risk as a one dimension of the construct (e.g., Michalos 
1990; Kramer 1999; Hudson 2004). Thus, one may say that although opportunistic behaviour 
is frequently related to trust, the causality effect is not obvious and feedback loops may occur. 
 
However, and despite the debate, it is accepted that the two concepts are indeed related. It is 
considered that the opportunism one partner perceives in its counterpart can help in the 
determination of the degree of trust demonstrated in that partner firm. And though the absence 
of opportunism does not necessarily lead to trust, its presence will decrease it. Contracts, for 
example, can be seen as forbearance to opportunism, but they do not build trust. So, to build 
trust more than “just” the absence of perceived opportunism is necessary. Trust goes beyond 
that. But, when the perception of opportunistic behaviour is high, a low degree of trust should 
be expected.  
 
Thus, it is reasonable to say that when building a perception of trust, a partner needs to form 
an idea about the perception of opportunistic behaviour of its homologue. Trust makes no 
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H1: + 
H2: + 
H3: + 
H4: - 
sense without risk. The risk arises from the existence of limited information, but not from 
complete information nor from no information whatsoever (Pagden 1988). 
 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) also refer to a negative influence in trust formation. In their opinion, 
when a party believes that a partner engages in opportunistic behaviour, such perception will 
lead to a decrease in trust.  
 
Based on this the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H4: there is a negative relationship between the opportunistic behaviour one partner 
perceives in the other and the trust placed in that partner. 
 
 
2.5 The proposed model 
Based on the literature reviewed the proposed hypotheses can be summarised as shown in the 
next figure (see Figure 2.1) and proposed the corresponding model. 
 
Figure 2.1 - Hypotheses and model proposed 
Hypothesis Model 
H1: there is a positive relationship between trust 
and performance  
H2: there is a positive relationship between values 
shared among partners and the trust one places in 
the other  
H3: there is a positive relationship between 
communication among partners and the trust one 
places in the other  
H4: there is a negative relationship between the 
opportunistic behaviour one partner perceives in 
the other and the trust placed in that partner 
 
 
Shared 
Values 
Performance 
Commu
nication 
Opportunistic 
Behaviour 
Trust 
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3. Methodology, research design and data analysis 
3.1 The unit of analysis of international alliances  
Following Gulati (1995) and Ring and Van de Ven (1994), and, subsequently Saxton (1997), 
it is conceived that the study of international alliances is better done using a relationship 
approach. In the current study, the goal is to infer the impact of trust on the performance of 
companies involved in international alliances. Trust is considered a relationship attribute and 
therefore the relationship is the object of analysis, while firms involved in international 
alliances are the unit of analysis. This is in line with one of the approaches established by Olk 
(2002) in his study of alliances performance. According to that author, there are two 
alternative approaches for evaluating performance of an alliance depending on the perspective 
under analysis: the alliance itself or the partners involved in the alliance. The first case is 
more suitable for the study of international joint ventures, since a separate entity is created 
that represents the alliance itself (e.g. Pfeffer and Nowak 1976; Geringer and Herbert 1989; 
Chowdhury 1992; Demirbag and Mirza 2000; Larimo 2003 ). The second case is more 
suitable for situations where no entity is created whose performance can be evaluated. It is the 
most common situation. For situations where no constraints are made concerning the type of 
alliance under study, the latter approach is more appropriate.  
 
In this second approach, the benefits of partners are evaluated. This can be done through the 
study of all the participants’ satisfaction in the alliance or through the study of just one of 
them. The first approach would produce better results although the latter approach is the 
easier option due to time and resource constraints. After choosing this approach, the next step 
is deciding how many respondents to question within a company. Here also, though several 
respondents are normally advised (e.g. Geringer and Herbert 1991), that option is not easily 
achievable due to the difficulty in obtaining responses from different individuals.   
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3.2 The difficulties in measuring alliances performance and researching on international 
alliances 
The lack of empirical evidence mentioned before can in some way be explained by the 
difficulties associated with researching on international alliances, especially on international 
alliances performance. In fact, the study of international alliances performance is far from 
consensual. First, there is no consensus on how to measure performance. Second, obtaining 
data to measure seems to be very difficult. These difficulties were already pointed out in 
Gulati (1998) and were reinforced by Kale, Dyer et al. (2002).  
 
3.2.1 How to measure performance 
The main debate here lies in the use of objective or subjective measures of performance. The 
former set includes: accounting measures of performance (such as sales, profits, market share, 
etc), survival rates, duration rates or instability rates. Subjective measures include indicators 
such as level of satisfaction with performance, and perceptions of the partner’s satisfaction 
level. However, there seems to be a problem in using accounting measures in situations where 
the alliance does not give rise to a third entity. 
 
In fact, it is very difficult to measure alliance performance using traditional accounting 
measures. This is the reason why some researchers use other objective measures such as 
longevity or stability in any alliance types except for international joint ventures in which a 
separate entity is created (Franko 1971; Killing 1982; Harrigan 1987)1. Harrigan (1988b) uses 
duration as a measure. However, this is less relevant if companies can not leave the alliance 
due to exit barriers (Harrigan 1987). In addition, termination may not necessarily be an 
                                               
1
 See for a revision: Yan and Zeng 1999; Ariño 2003.  
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indicator of alliance failure. It can mean that the alliance achieved the objective for which it 
was created and therefore was no longer required (Bissessur and Alamdari 1998). The same 
happens with stability. An alliance may be stable without being considered successful. Thus, 
duration, continuation or even survival are fallacious measures and may lead to opinions that 
do not correspond to reality, because they “fail to distinguish between alliances that fail and 
therefore die, and those that accomplish their objectives and thus outlive their utility.” (Kale, 
Dyer et al. 2002, p. 753). Therefore, it is believed that it is necessary to rely on different 
measures.  
 
Indeed, a group of researchers proposed that performance can be measured through all 
partners’ subjective assessment of the alliances in which their companies are involved. The 
use of this set of measures, besides more appropriate for alliances other than joint ventures, 
seems to produce comparable results to the ones obtained with the use of the first set of 
measures. Killing (1982), for instance, found that subjective measures of a joint venture’s 
performance and measures of performance on longevity produced the same results. In order to 
disentangle the decision of which measures of satisfaction to use, Geringer and Herbert  
(1989) studied a correlation between the subjective and objective types of measures. Two 
years later, these authors further developed that work and confirmed the existence of a high 
correlation between subjective assessments of performance with more objective measures, 
based on accounting data. Besides some limitations related with financial measures, they also 
pointed out that one type of measure could be used in the place of the other.  
 
Anderson (1990) also listed some limitations and argue that financial measures assess only 
one dimension of performance and defends the inclusion of qualitative factors in the analysis. 
Chowdhury (1992) and Demirbag and Mirza (2000) also claim that traditional accounting 
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figures are statistically insufficient to distinguish more successful firms from less successful 
ones. Following this line, Dussauge and Garrette (1995) use perceptual performance measures 
as proxies of objective measures.  
 
In the literature there are also authors that prefer the use of a combination of different 
categories of the above measures. For instance, Teegen and Doh (2002) claim that 
“…objective performance measures such as financial returns, interests of allies extended to 
matters such as reputation enhancement/protection, relationship maintenance, and precedent-
setting…” should be included in the analysis of performance as well as perceptual measures  
“…as the primary-firm benefit in the negotiation context…” (p. 760). On the other hand, there 
are also authors that prefer the exclusive use of perceptual measures, referring to the need to 
capture the diverse and idiosyncratic evaluation criteria of the firms that are negotiating 
alliances (Yan and Gray 1994; Johnson 1999).  
 
Also of interest is the finding of Ramaseshan and Loo (1998). They refer to a positive 
correlation between a partner’s satisfaction and the other partner’s satisfaction for the same 
alliance. “This implied that a partner’s response is sufficient to provide a reliable source for 
analysing the effectiveness of an alliance.” (p. 445) The measure used – “perceived 
effectiveness of alliance” – was defined as “the extent the partner perceives whether partners 
were committed to the alliance and find it to be productive and worthwhile (Bucklin and 
Sengupta 1993).” It was initially developed in organisation theory and it was suggested by 
Ruekert and Walker Jr. (2001) and used in Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) for measuring the 
success of co-marketing alliances.   
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In our opinion, perceptions of partner’s satisfaction level will be an adequate form of 
measuring performance in international alliances. Despite the fact that “managerial 
assessments of alliance performance received some initial criticism for reasons of bias and 
inaccuracy.” (Kale, Dyer et al. 2002, p. 753), it is understood that the arguments and tests 
above invoked are sufficient to sustain that position. This claim is also based on the belief that 
managerial perceptions of performance and objective measures are strongly correlated, which 
is the opinion of  several authors that consider alliance performance using managerial 
assessments (Pearce, Robbins et al. 1987; Narver and Slater 1990; Mohr and Spekman 1994; 
Smith and Barclay 1997; Zou, Taylor et al. 1998; Young-Ybarra and Wiersema 1999; Teegen 
and Doh 2002; Nguyen, Barrett et al. 2003). It is assumed that assessing managers’ 
perceptions on alliance success may serve as an indicator for the performance attributed to 
that relationship.  
 
3.2.2 How to obtain data 
The next step is the identification of international alliances as the universe of analysis. This is 
per se a very difficult task since there are no databases or secondary data available on this 
international entry mode, which does not require reporting to the authorities. In fact, contrary 
to what happens with mergers and acquisitions, for instance, there is no obligation to provide 
any official statement of an international partnership agreement. Thus, two companies may 
decide to pursue an alliance without this being known. Consequently, much of the empirical 
work done in this field is conducted, either through case studies, or through the use of primary 
data, collected through what is called the “literature-counting method” (Hagedoorn and 
Narula 1996). There are several shortcomings ascribed to this method of information 
gathering,  namely drawbacks resulting from “…bias against the recording of those events 
that are only reported in non-English (national) sources, and those involving smaller firms.” 
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(Patel 1998, p. 7). However, Hagedoorn and Narula (1996, p. 270) defend that the method can 
produce a clear picture of the joint efforts of many companies, claiming that it enables “…to 
perform empirical research which goes beyond case studies or general statements.” Some 
authors rely on this method and consider it appropriate (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad 1994; 
Cecil, Green et al. 1996; Hagedoorn and Narula 1996; Johnson, Cullen et al. 1996; 
McNaughton 2001; Ramaya, Khayum et al. 2003; Palmberg and Martikainen 2004). 
 
When considering the “literature-counting alliance” method, other difficulties arise in 
subsequent stages of research on international alliances. Even when a list of relevant alliances 
is drawn, since the data necessary to infer about performance is primary, managers involved 
in those alliances have to be individually identified. Indeed, performance is, along with the 
trust construct and its antecedents, a latent variable, measuring a latent construct that is not 
directly observed. Thus, opinions have to be collected, irrespectively from the data collection 
method and methodology. And in this stage there is an evident difficulty: collecting data from 
one-single respondent or from various respondents. Aulakh et al. (1996), Inkpen and Currall 
(1998), Zaheer et al. (1998a), Teegen and Doh (2002) and Kauser and Shaw (2004), for 
instance, advise the use of multiple respondents. However, this represents greater difficulties, 
namely the access to respondents and the increase in the obstacles of obtaining data.  
 
3.3 Data collection 
The research took place in Portugal, based on a database of companies engaged in 
international activity which was collected through a “literature-counting alliances” approach 
(Hagedoorn and Narula 1996). As the intention was to measure performance through 
manager’s opinions, all entries with a contact name were selected. Seeing that most of the 
contacts also had an e-mail address, a web-based survey was carried out (e.g. Dillman 2000; 
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Dillman 2001). Contact names were selected to receive a personalised e-mail embedded with 
the link for the survey, with an explanation of the purpose of the study and the importance of 
their collaboration for the understanding of trust.  
 
The questionnaire had questions related with the five main constructs described above (see 
Table 3.1). 
 
Table 3.1 - Constructs under study 
Construct Reference Questions2 
Shared 
Values 
Young-
Ybarra and 
Wiersema 
(1999)  
Regarding the values between you and your partner company please indicate the degree to 
which you feel that: 
a) Our goals and objectives for this alliance are shared by our partner company 
b) Our partner company had similar motives for forming this alliance 
Communi- 
Cation 
(Young-
Ybarra and 
Wiersema 
1999) 
Regarding communication between you and your partner company please indicate the degree to 
which you feel that: 
a) we always keep each other informed about events or changes that may affect the other 
party 
b) It is expected that any information that might help the other party will be provided to 
them 
c) It is expected that proprietary information will be shared if it can help the other party 
d) Exchange of information in this alliance takes place frequently and informally, not 
only according to a pre-specified agreement 
Opportunis- 
tic  
Behaviour 
(Morgan 
and Hunt 
1994) 
With respect to your partner company’s behaviour in the present alliance: 
a) Sometimes my partner company alters the facts slightly in order to get what it needs3 
b) My partner company has sometimes promised to do things without actually doing 
them later 
c) To accomplish its own objectives, sometimes my partner company fails to provide us 
with the support that it is obliged to 
Trust (Morgan 
and Hunt 
1994) 
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements: 
In our relationship my partner company: 
a) Cannot be trusted at times4 
b) Is perfectly honest and truthful 
c) Can be trusted completely 
d) Can be counted on to do what is right 
e) Is always faithful 
f) Is someone I have great confidence in 
g) Has high integrity 
Performance (Zou, 
Taylor et 
al. 1998) 
Our firm’s performance in this alliance: 
a) …has been very profitable 
b) …has generated high volume sales 
c) …has achieved rapid growth 
Our firm’s strategic performance in this alliance: 
d) …has improved our global competitiveness 
e) …has strengthened our strategic position3 
f) …has significantly increased our global market share3 
Regarding the overall satisfaction with this alliance: 
g) The performance of this relationship has been very satisfactory 
h) This relationship has been very successful 
i) This relationship has fully met our expectations 
                                               
2
 All items are 7-point Likert scales; anchors: strongly disagree/strongly agree.  
3
 Reverse-coded item. 
4
 Dropped. 
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From a sample of 3,705 potential respondents, 232 completed web-based questionnaires were 
received, resulting in a response rate similar to other studies conducted through comparable 
modes (e.g. Tse, Tse et al. 1995). Half of the respondents reported a partnership with one of 
four countries: Spain, Germany, France and United Kingdom. Over 60% of the surveys 
referred to small or medium sized firms, mainly using agency and outsourcing agreements. 
The average duration of the relationship to which they decided to refer was 9 years. On 
average companies were involved in 6.94 relationships at the time they responded.  
 
Tests were conducted to ensure the absence of non-response bias. Sampling, coverage and 
measurement errors were also evaluated and the sample considered acceptable, given the 
constructs under study. There were no missing values in our sample because responses to all 
the questions were mandatory. Otherwise the respondent could not advance in the web-survey 
and a message was displayed asking to complete the unanswered question. For the same 
reason there was no space for univariate or multivariate outliers.  
 
3.4 Data analysis  
3.4.1 Confirmatory factor analysis 
Factor analysis was considered the most appropriate technique to analyse the data. Therefore, 
sample size, missing data, normality and linearity, outliers, multicollinearity, singularity and 
factorability requirements were verified to conclude that the data was appropriate.  
 
The model specification proposed was subject to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), which 
was conducted using AMOS 6.0 with maximum likelihood (ML) estimation method (Byrne 
2001) to assess construct validity and convergent validity. The measurement model allows the 
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development of accurate and reliable measures (Craig and Douglas 2002). This model is 
given by the analysis of links between the factors and their measured variables. In our case, 
all the variables were latent since they were not directly observable. Therefore, measuring 
instruments are used as proxies that work as indicators of the latent constructs.  
 
The CFA model tests the multidimensionality of a theoretical construct (Byrne 2001). In the 
current study, relationships between the five constructs were specified a priori and tested. The 
standardised regression weights associated to three items produced low loadings. Those items 
also produced small squared multiple correlations and therefore a purification procedure was 
conducted. Comrey (1973) suggest a minimum level of 0.63 for loadings to be considered 
very good. This threshold was used and based on that three items were removed: two in the 
performance scale and one in the trust scale.  
 
Using SPSS 14.0, the resulting factors produced satisfactory reliabilities, measured through 
coefficient Alpha. Coefficient Alpha is, according to Tabachnick and Fidell  (1989) the 
appropriate measure to infer about reliability. This coefficient provides a good indication of 
the average correlation among the items that make up a scale. Higher values indicate greater 
reliability. 0.7 represents the recommended minimum (Nunnally 1978). In all cases, the 
minimum was surpassed (see Table 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2 - Items removed and retained after the purification of scales 
Factor Items removed Items retained Coefficient Alpha 
Shared Values 0 2 0.807 
Communication 0 4 0.840 
Opportunistic Behaviour 0 3 0.778 
Trust 1 6 0.922 
Performance 2 7 0.928 
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After scale purification, the measurement model should be evaluated. The estimation of the 
CFA model produced the following results (see Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3 - Results from the Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Constructs Items Factor loadings 
t-
value 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Alpha 
Composite 
Reliability 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted 
1 0.955 - 0.912 Shared Values 2 0.711 9.733 0.506 0.807 0.827 0.709 
1 0.740 - 0.548 
2 0.791 11.387 0.625 
3 0.809 11.624 0.654 Communication 
4 0.7 10.099 0.490 
0.840 0.846 0.579 
1 0.688 - 0.474 
2 0.683 8.637 0.466 Opportunistic Behaviour 3 0.828 9.326 0.686 
0.778 0.779 0.542 
1 0.875 - 0.765 
2 0.852 17.692 0.726 
3 0.825 16.655 0.681 
4 0.845 17.433 0.715 
5 0.858 17.950 0.737 
Trust 
6 0.901 19.861 0.812 
0.922 0.944 0.739 
1 0.827 - 0.683 
2 0.901 17.423 0.811 
3 0.929 18.321 0.864 
4 0.654 10.956 0.428 
5 0.643 10.723 0.414 
6 0.703 12.046 0.494 
Performance 
7 0.716 12.340 0.512 
0.928 0.912 0.6 
 
The measurement model for each of the constructs suggests a good fit of the data. In fact,  
with regard to reliability, the Coefficient Alpha’s, also know as “Cronbach Alpha” (Peter 
1979), minimum recommended level of 0.7 (Nunnally 1978) was achieved, as all the values 
range from 0.778 to 0.928. Construct reliability, computed with the help of the measurement 
error, also helps in the assessment of reliability. According to Bagozzi and Yi (1989) it has a 
minimum recommended level of 0.60, which was surpassed as the minimum value for our 
data is 0.779. The average variance extracted for all the constructs demonstrates support for 
convergent validity (Bagozzi and Yi 1988). Indeed, all values exceed the recommended level 
of 0.5, ranging from 0.542 to 0.739.  
 
 27 
Our data passed the reliability tests. In terms of validity, convergent validity was ensured 
through loading factors. Based on a significance level of 0.05, significant factor loadings are 
those greater than ±0.4 Hair et al. (1998). In our case, the minimum factor loading is 0.643, a 
value that, according to Comrey (1973) is considered very good. It is also possible to say that 
convergent validity is evident in the current case because of the large and significant 
standardized loadings (t>1.96; p<0.05), reported in the third column of Table 3.3. These 
values indicate that scales are measuring the intended concepts. 
 
Discriminant validity has to do with the relationship between the above constructs and others 
that are unrelated (Pallant 2000). It ensures that the scale is sufficiently different from other 
similar concepts. Thus, the correlation between constructs should be significantly different 
from one (Gerbing and Anderson 1988), which is the case as it can be confirmed with the 
observation of the values bellow the main diagonal in Table 3.4.  
 
Table 3.4 - Correlation between constructs 
 Shared Values Communication Opportunistic Behaviour Trust Performance 
Shared Values 0.842     
Communication 0.654 0.761    
Opportunistic Behaviour -0.257 -0.409 0.736   
Trust 0.513 0.630 -0.571 0.86  
Performance 0.490 0.468 -0.403 0.559 0.775 
 
A powerful test for ensuring for discriminant validity was developed by Fornell and Larcker 
(1981). The procedure involves the calculation of the squared average variance extracted (see 
table 3.3 for the value of the average variance extracted) for all pairs of constructs. These 
values are listed in the main diagonal of the previous matrix. Those values should be 
compared with the correlation between the constructs of interest and be greater if discriminant 
validity is in accordance. The data passed this test too and therefore the discriminant validity 
is ensured. 
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To test nomological validity it is necessary to use prior research or accepted principles to 
verify the scales. Proceeding accordingly was ensured. Although constructs were used in a 
different context, all of them were measuring the same constructs as before. This is due to the 
use of already calibrated and tested measurements.  
 
3.4.2 The structural equation model 
The conceptual model proposed in Table 3.1 had several relationships that had to be tested 
simultaneously. Therefore, it was believed that in order to capture the full effect of all the 
relationships at the same time, structural equations modelling (SEM) should be used. 
According to Blomqvist et al. (2002) “the usage of SEM can be considered more proper” for 
situations in which concepts under analysis are “soft” and because explaining variables 
correlate with each other often. In the model fit, when comparing coefficients of 
determination in the SEM alternative vs. the alternative of regression analysis, higher 
indicators were found in the first case. Thus, those simultaneous equations were computed 
using AMOS 6.0 and the model estimated through the maximum likelihood estimation 
method. The model has 22 observed variables, out of 51 in total, which include measurement 
and latent variable errors and inter-correlations between the latent constructs (see Figure 3.1). 
 
Despite the significant chi-square statistic of the model (χ2=408,846, df=201, p<.000), the fit 
indices Incremental Fit Index (IFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) and Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) produced very reasonable results. According to Hair et al. (1998), those indexes should 
have values above 0.9, which was the case. Because the adequacy of a model to the sample 
data needs more than just global fit indexes (Byrne 2001), other criteria have to be used 
whenever possible. Thus, relying on the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
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(RMSEA) is a frequent procedure used in literature akin. The structural equation model 
produced a RMSEA compatible with the range of values proposed by Hair et al. (1998) of  
[0.05;0.08].  
 
Figure 3.1 - The structural equation model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, on the basis of the reliability and validity tests conducted and the goodness-of-fit 
analysis one may say that the model fits the data well in the population from which the 
sample was drawn.  
 
3.4.3 Assessment of research hypothesis 
After a model that fits the data is obtained, parameter estimates should be interpreted as well 
as individual tests of significance of each parameter estimated. Standardized estimates and 
corresponding t-values allow the assessment of research hypothesis. Four relationships were 
hypothesised and confirmed (see Table 3.5). 
 
 
Shared 
Values
Communication
Opportunistic
Behaviour
Trust Performance
0.184
2.391
0.361
4.118
-0.382
-5.412
0.583
8.755
R2=0.544
R2=0.339
χ2=408,846, df=201
IFI=0.942
TLI=0.933
CFI=0.942
RMSEA=0.067
Note: standardized parameter estimate above and t-value below the arrow. All estimates are significant at 95% level of 
significance. 
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Table 3.5 - Assessment of research hypothesis 
 
Hypothesis Expected 
sign 
Estimated 
parameter 
p-
value Assessment 
H1 there is a positive relationship between shared 
values among partners and trust one places in 
the other 
+ 0.184 0.017 + Significant 
at 95% Supported 
H2 there is a positive relationship between 
communication among partners and trust one 
places in the other 
+ 0.361 0.000 + Significant 
at 99% Supported 
H3 there is a negative relationship between the 
opportunistic behaviour one partner perceives 
in the other and the trust placed in it  
- -0.382 0.000 - Significant 
at 99% Supported 
H4 there is a positive relationship between trust 
and performance + 0.583 0.000 + 
Significant 
at 99% Supported 
 
Taking into account the normally used p<0.5 level for statistical inference one may confirm 
the entire group of hypothesis initially raised. Therefore, trust antecedents proposed by 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) were confirmed. In the case of shared values, it may de said that, 
when the influence of shared values increases one unit, trust increases 0.184 units. A stronger 
impact comes from communication whereby an increase of one unit leads to an increase in 
trust of 0.361 units. The strongest impact on trust formation comes from opportunistic 
behaviour. Indeed, when the perception of opportunistic behaviour increases one unit, trust 
decreases 0.382 units. The largest  impact on trust according to Morgan and Hunt (1994) was 
also due to opportunistic behaviour, revealing that in the development of trust the perceived 
opportunistic behaviour of the partner is a fundamental keystone in the perception of 
confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity.  
 
In what concerns the last hypothesis, it is possible to verify that, according to the data, when 
trust increases one unit, performance rises 0.583 units.  
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4. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Trust and international alliances 
The measurement of the satisfaction with a particular international partnership was calculated 
through the perceived performance. The impact of trust in that measurement was inferred. It 
was possible to verify empirically this relationship which, though often used in alliances 
literature, has not been proven (e.g. Zaheer, McEvily et al. 1998a; Möllering 2003 ). As stated 
in Sako (1998, p. 88), “While theoretical explorations on the link between trust and 
performance abound, empirical studies in this area are rare.” In this way, the empirical 
evidence necessary to fill the gap was missing.  
 
The results showed that trust does indeed exert a positive influence on performance. This 
finding is the confirmation of a recent trend that has been assumed in business nowadays. The 
trend that gives trust a crucial role in the management of relationship seems to constitute the 
end of a cycle in which fear and intimidation were the most effective way to manage 
relationships. This drift became particularly apparent when companies moved from the use of 
competitive strategies to collaborative ones, irrespectively of the motivation behind the 
strategy pursued. The acuteness of this tendency gains even more relevance in partnerships 
established with commercial rather than research and development goals. In this type of 
partnership, the recent wave of mergers and acquisitions, strategic alliances and networks 
seem to consubstantiate the idea that, although exerting power may produce better results in 
the short run, in the long run the exploitation of those imbalances may bring disadvantageous 
outcomes. Therefore, companies learned that the relations established with their partners 
should be object of a careful management, namely in agreements with other firms regarding 
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pursuing common interests, exploring complementarities, and gaining access to new 
resources.  
 
Trust is important in partnerships 
In the process of exploring the advantages of cooperating, trust plays a key role. Besides the 
recognition of this fact by managers that often cite lack of trust for the failure of partnerships 
(Gomes-Casseres 2000b), trust benefits are also explored by academics. The benefits of trust 
were recognised in the literature by several authors. Bharadwaj and Matsunob (2006); 
Buckley and Casson (1988); Ganesan (1994); Nooteboom (1999a); Nooteboom (1996) 
recognised the impact of trust in the reduction of transaction costs. But to trust was also 
assigned other advantages such as the reduction of opportunism (Bradach and Eccles 1989; 
Hill 1990; Chiles and McMackin 1996), allowing firms to rely confidently on their partners 
(Butler Jr. 1991; Moorman, Deshpande et al. 1993), and increasing the incidence of 
constructive conflict resolution (Weitz and Jap 1995). Kumar (1996) adds the possible 
exploitation of complementary skills of the parts, naming not only transaction costs reduction, 
but also quick adaptation to marketplace changes and the development of more creative 
solutions to meet customers needs. 
 
Trust was also recognised by Bibb and Kourdi (2004) as having important advantages for 
firms such as: increased productivity, competitive advantage creation, improvement of 
communication and improved mutual understanding, transparency and risk-taking 
(Bogenrieder and Nooteboom 2004). A commitment to quality and innovation (Child 2001) 
can also be achieved if partners in a relationship believe that their contribution to the 
partnership outcome is relevant and that, by aligning their activities and resources, a result 
larger than the sum of singular parts is possible.  Some of these advantages can 
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simultaneously be seen as determinants and outcomes of the trust process, as already referred 
to by Seppänen et al. (Forthcoming), which allows the recognition that trust builds trust and 
may lead to a virtuous circle (Child 2001).   
 
Trust determinants 
After a review of what the literature points out as the main ideas behind trust, the decision 
was taken to rely on Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) model of commitment and trust, specifically 
on trust determinants, using it to evaluate the trust-performance relationship. In this sample, it 
was possible to replicate equivalent influences, with the perception of partner opportunistic 
behaviour as the most relevant in the formation of trust, followed closely by communication. 
This can be attributed to the fact that the alliances studied were primarily commercial 
alliances, of distribution/agency and subcontracting agreement types. In these types of 
alliances, imbalances in power are more frequent than in alliances whose different resources, 
namely tacit knowledge, are complemented with common goals in mind, that is: in alliances 
whose main goal is the joint development of a product, process, technology or knowledge. In 
distribution alliances it is also acceptable that less emphasis is placed on the values shared 
among partners than in alliances such as licensing agreements, technology transfers or joint 
ventures designed for the development of a competency.  
 
Trust positively influences performance 
In this study, it was observed that trust can indeed work as a catalyst for satisfaction in inter-
firm relations, especially in relationships established with partners from other countries. 
Moreover, it was observed that in building and maintaining trust, there are at least three 
elements to which relevance should be consigned: shared values, communication and 
opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, it can be confirmed that, in on-going alliances, in order to 
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contribute to a successful relationship, all partners should pay close attention to the elements 
that are likely to build and maintain trust. 
 
Considering the suggestion proposed by Zaheer et al. (1998a) the link trust-performance was 
studied at the same time as the determinants of trust. From this standpoint it was possible to 
recognise that partners’ alignment in terms of motives for the partnership and goals, their 
organisational culture, their own way of working, decision-making processes and policies, 
have an important impact on trust development. Therefore, it is expected that trust takes some 
time to grow and that limits of trustworthiness may be widen with time. It is also possible to 
recognise that keeping a close eye on the information that may be important for the 
partnership, updating and subsequent disclosure to the partner can also increase trust. 
Providing information signals reliance and stimulates reciprocity in a partner’s behaviour. 
Provision of information, even when unilaterally was also found to enhance trust (Sako 1998). 
Besides these catalyser attitudes that help to build and maintain trust, there is also a 
hampering effect to be considered. This results from the perceived opportunistic risk that a 
company attains from its relationship. Consequently, it is imperative to consider positive 
responses to promises, goal attainment, honesty, integrity, forbearance from opportunistic 
behaviours, and regular evaluation of the risks involved in the partnership as important 
attitudes to have a close look at.  
 
Those attitudes were found to affect trust and indirectly influence the performance attained 
from the partnership. This overall finding was missing from empirical evidence that can be 
found in international alliances literature. Evidence for it was provided.  
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Limitations  
However, this study is not free from limitations. One has to do with incapacity “to overcome 
dyadic reductionism” (Gulati 1998)  and the correspondent examination of the dyadic 
relationship embedded in the context where other relationships have to be considered. Also, 
only one side of the relationship was observed, contrary to the advice of authors such as 
Aulakh et al. (1996) and Kauser and Shaw (2004), due to the evident difficulty in obtaining 
information simultaneously from both sides of a relationship. 
 
Concepts used in this study are reliable and show validity. However, it is very difficult to 
capture all of their complexities when using a method that implies the measurement of 
concepts that are, apparently, non-quantifiable. That is the case of trust (Bibb and Kourdi 
2004). This also constitutes a limitation of this study which is common to most of the studies 
that use quantitative techniques to perform qualitative studies. On the other hand, as 
mentioned by Blomqvist et al. (2002) replication was somehow achieved. An existent model 
in a different setting was not used, because Morgan and Hunt (1994)’s model was employed 
to study trust and commitment at the same time. However, the part of their model concerning 
trust was tested and results similar to their own were obtained.  
 
Further research  
As avenues for further research, the study of trust simultaneously with other relationship 
attributes, such as commitment and conflict/control (which Demirbag and Mirza (2000) had 
already suggested) is recommended. Further developments of this work could be pursued by 
extending the developed framework to international alliances established in a different 
context, whether geographical or industrial.  
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There are clear struggles asserted to the obtaining of the necessary primary data, using just 
single respondents and studying just one side of the relationship. The study could be 
improved if multiple-respondents were used and if both sides in the relationship had been 
studied. The dynamic aspect of trust is also a perspective that requires closer attention than 
that given here. In fact, the main logic in the analysis did not account for the fact that the 
relationship evolves over time and that the path it follows may affect partners’ decisions to 
continue to cooperate and their perception of performance (Harrigan 1985a; Smith, Carroll et 
al. 1995).  
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